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no Card

4 January 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director (Intelligence)
SUBJECT : Comments on Letter of [REDACTED] 25X1X
25X1X [REDACTED] Forwarded to DCI
by Joseph V. Charyk, Under
Secretary of the Department
of the Air Force

25X1X

1. [REDACTED] makes several statements in his letter on the subjects of Soviet military and naval deliveries to Cuba and of the maintenance in Cuba of Soviet offensive missile systems. His information is apparently not first hand, but appears to come from Cuban refugees, some of whom he claims to have helped escape from Cuba. [REDACTED] 25X1C

2. [REDACTED] reports that last June the Russians sent to Cuba three flotillas of fifteen torpedo boats each, a total of 45. Information available to OCI indicates that there are 16 Soviet-made motor torpedo boats in Cuba and twelve KOMAR-class missile boats, a total of 28 of both kinds. In addition, there are six KHRONSTADT-class submarine chasers in Cuba. [REDACTED] 25X1X

[REDACTED] 25X1B
[REDACTED] These arrivals were reported in OCI publications at the time and have been verified by photographic coverage.

25X1X

3. [REDACTED] reports that during the quarantine--23 October to 20 November--an unstated number of Russian tankers unloaded missiles, crated bombers and fighters, and ammunition at night in Havana harbor. By day, they discharged oil. This is considered highly unlikely. During the quarantine, six Soviet tankers arrived at Havana and none of these appears from photography to have carried large items of military equipment. There is no indication in evidence available to OCI since 1955 on Soviet arms shipments to other countries, that such equipment was ever carried by Soviet tankers to any country. Certainly, no missiles, aircraft, or other large items of equipment have been delivered by Soviet tankers to any of the major recipients of bloc arms. None of the tankers now used by the USSR is capable of carrying MRBMs or IRBMs without extensive modifications. There are no openings on the decks of these ships large enough to allow for the loading of such missiles below decks and the missiles are too long to lie down or stand up within the holds of any of these tankers. Necessary modifications for the carrying of such equipment probably would be easily distinguishable in photography, and there has been no evidence of this. We cannot exclude the possibility, however, that small quantities of light arms and ammunition may have been clandestinely shipped on Soviet tankers.

25X1X

4. [REDACTED] claims that the missile sites photographed by US reconnaissance planes--presumably he is referring to the strategic missile sites--were "outdoor exhibits" set up in September especially for US observation. The "permanent installations," he says, were already installed by August. To this, we can only say that the activity and equipment observed in photography of the MRBM and IRBM sites certainly looked genuine and we believe they were. Subsequent close-up photography and observation of the missiles on departing Soviet vessels tends to confirm this.

25X1X

25X1X 5. [REDACTED] reports that copper mines near Mariel and a sugar mill near Guanajay are the sites of elaborately equipped and concealed missile installations. The missiles at the former, he says, are "three meters longer than any we photographed." His details sound highly improbable. It would seem, for instance, that a strategic missile installation, however elaborate, would be handicapped if, as [REDACTED] [REDACTED] says, it is underground and dependent on 18 small holes to the open sky. Improbable as it sounds, however, it must be pointed out that both the copper mine and the sugar mill he mentioned are near the former MRBM and IRBM sites at San Cristobal and Guanajay.

25X1X

15/
R. J. SMITH
Assistant Director
Current Intelligence

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